The passage of time – combined with outcomes and deeper reflection – can sometimes lead a person to change their thinking.
Back in August, I authored a commentary titled “Federal D.C. Takeover for the Best.” The core argument was straightforward:
Despite some statistical declines, Washington, D.C., continued to experience elevated violent crime, including nearly 200 homicides in 2024 – figures that reflected a persistent public-safety crisis. Under the Home Rule Act, the city’s unique legal status grants the president authority to intervene, authority President Trump invoked under Section 740 to assume control of the Metropolitan Police Department during what he described as emergency conditions. While the move raised legitimate concerns about federal overreach, I argued its ultimate merit would be judged by results – whether crime declined without trampling civil liberties.
Is the mission itself virtuous? My heart still says yes. My head isn’t so sure.
Thanksgiving night, a source sent me a text message pointing to conversations taking place on the ground about the authorized carry condition of weapons issued to guardsmen operating in the District. Since then, additional sources have raised the same concern.
When people talk about how firearms are carried, particularly in official or security settings, they are usually referring to standardized “conditions” that describe how ready a weapon is to fire.
Condition 1 is essentially a firearm that is fully loaded and ready: a magazine inserted, a round chambered, the action closed, and the safety engaged. It is the fastest condition for immediate use and is commonly described as “ready to fire.”
Condition 3 represents a step back from that level of readiness. The magazine is inserted, but the chamber is empty. The bolt or slide is forward and the safety is on. In this condition, the weapon cannot fire until a round is deliberately chambered.
Condition 4 is the least ready state. There is no magazine inserted, the chamber is empty, the action is closed, and the safety is engaged. In practical terms, the firearm is not loaded and cannot be fired without multiple intentional steps.
Together, these conditions reflect a spectrum – from fully ready, to partially ready, to completely unloaded – and they are central to how armed personnel balance readiness with safety.
Seeking clarity on what condition West Virginia Guardsmen were authorized to carry, interview requests were sent to Adjutant General Jim Seward; he was unavailable. Questions were posed to the Governor’s Office in his role as Guard Commander-in-Chief:
1. Were the WV Guardsmen armed on the day of the shooting? Were the two guardsmen who were shot carrying weapons?
2. If so, in what condition were they authorized to carry? My understanding is that three carry conditions are typically used: Condition 1, Condition 3, and Condition 4.
Staffers, in response, referred me to remarks General Seward made during a gubernatorial press conference.
Based on that clip, it is reasonable to conclude that both Sarah Beckstrom and Andrew Wolfe were armed at the time of the shooting, even though that was never explicitly confirmed. What remains unresolved is the condition in which their weapons were carried.
General Seward stated that the guardsmen were operating as deputized U.S. Marshals while in the District. If that description is accurate, it would logically follow that they were adhering to standard U.S. Marshals Service weapons protocols. Was that indeed the case? In comparable operational environments, my understanding is that Marshals typically carry in a fully ready state – Condition 1.
Requests for clarification directed both to the Governor’s Office and to the Office of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau have gone unanswered.
As Chris Stirewalt, a District resident, noted on Talkline Friday, D.C. Metropolitan Police officers are now escorting guardsmen while they patrol.
Here’s why these questions matter: Understanding whether, and how, the two guardsmen were positioned to immediately respond goes directly to their ability to defend themselves.
Aside from the fact the Guard was deployed to D.C. to address a “crime emergency,” that question takes on added significance in light of reporting by The New York Times that Guard commanders had been warned via internal memo that troops were operating in a “heightened threat environment.”
A Wall Street Journal image depicting a guardsman attempting to create distance from the Afghan national while “racking the slide” of his sidearm only deepens those questions.
Yes, the Afghan national – innocent until proven guilty – pulled the trigger and bears ultimate responsibility. Upon due process, his punishment should reflect that crime. He ambushed our guardsmen; they may never have had a meaningful chance to defend themselves.
But if our guardsmen were assigned a mission and simultaneously denied the highest level of readiness and self-defense, then we failed them. If so, we asked them to do a dangerous job while limiting their ability to protect themselves. That reality must be examined – not to assign blame, but to ensure we learn from any mistake, if a mistake was made.
That becomes impossible to know or internalize when legitimate questions go unanswered.
There are still 2,000 guardsmen in Washington, D.C. An appeals court order supersedes a district court order meaning the Trump administration may keep them there, at least for now. The Pentagon reports those troops are “now armed” but hasn’t released information on what condition those guardsmen are authorized to use.
If our leaders continue to believe in this mission – and if they expect continued public support – then the public must be assured that our guardsmen are not handicapped in any way, for any reason, and fully able to defend against threats. Minus that, Governor Morrisey should recall them from the District, suspending now voluntary service.
Would you walk that duty at less than fully prepared? Most wouldn’t. Why should we expect guardsmen to?